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  German R&D-intensive industries: Value 
added and productivity have recovered 
considerably after the crisis
by heike Belitz, martin Gornig und Alexander schiersch
No large industrialized nation is as strongly specialized in the pro-
duction of R&D-intensive goods as Germany.1 In the crisis year 2009 
these export-oriented industries had to pass a crucial test. The slump 
in sales endangered both specialized jobs and the financing of high 
R&D expenditures, and thus the ability of these industries to compe-
te technologically in the future. 
The Commission of Experts for Research and Innovation (Experten-
kommission Forschung und Innovation - EFI), which regularly in-
forms the German government about the status and prospects of 
Germany’s  technological  performance,  requires  early  indications 
about the development of R&D-intensive industries. Detailed compa-
rative international data regarding industrial development, such as 
the EU KLEMS Datenbasis and the OECD STAN data, is only availab-
le with a lag of two to three years. This is why the DIW has estimated 
the value added and the volume of labour input for R&D-intensive 
industries in Germany, the US, Japan, France and the UK for the 
period from 2008 to 2010 (Box 1). This extended database is used 
to analyze the development of production and labour productivity 
up to the present.2
1  Belitz, H., Clemens, M., Gornig, M., Schiersch, A., Schumacher, D.: Wirtschaftsstrukturen, Produktivität 
und Außenhandel im internationalen Vergleich. Studien zum deutschen Innovationssystem No. 5/2010. 
Pub.: Commission of Experts for Research and Innovation, Berlin, February 2010. www.e-fi.de.
2  Belitz, H., Clemens, M., Gornig, M., Schiersch, A., Schumacher, D.: Wirtschaftsstrukturen, Produktivität 
und Außenhandel im internationalen Vergleich. Studien zum deutschen Innovationssystem No. 4/2011. 
Pub.: Commission of Experts for Research and Innovation, Berlin, February 2011. www.e-fi-de.
Traditionally strong specialization of Germany on R&D-
intensive industrial goods
The long-term development of structural differences 
and specialization patterns in the industries of different 
countries and regions can be measured based on their 
relative share on value added. This is the contribution 
of an industry to the nominal value added in a  country, 
compared to the same ratio calculated using all countries 
in the analysis, which are here Germany, the US, Japan 
and the EU-25 (relative share of value added or RVA).3 
When comparing Germany to other European countries, 
a distinction is made between the EU-14 (members of 
the EU before 2004 with the exception of Germany) and 
the EU-10 (members joining in 2004).
An international comparison clearly reveals the strength 
of Germany’s specialization on R&D-intensive indust-
ries, especially high-level technologies, and how this spe-
cialization increased up to 2007 (Figure 1). Until the be-
ginning of the financial and economic crises, Germany 
was the country most clearly specialized on R&D-inten-
sive industries. Only Japan has a similar specialization 
pattern, whereas the other countries are not specialized 
on these sectors. Germany also has an especially broad-
ly diversified portfolio in this regard: Seven out of ten 
R&D-intensive industries have positive RVAs. This is far 
higher than in the benchmark regions. Even in terms of 
cutting-edge technologies, Germany is now well above 
the average of all regions considered.
Japan is the only other nation also specialized in the sub-
segment of cutting-edge technologies, as it is strong in 
office machinery, computers and communication equip-
ment. The US is most heavily specialized in the cutting-
3  The RVAs are listed here in natural logarithms multiplied by 100. A value 
of 0 for all sectors would indicate that the shares are identical. Positive values 
signify the share is higher than average, while negative values mean it is lower 
than average. The greater the amount, the greater the (relative) difference in 
share. Also refer to the RCA in the box within the following article.7 DIW Economic Bulletin 2.2011
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duction at the end of 2008 and in 2009. However, the 
long-term success of German industry has prompted the 
US and the UK in particular to call for policy actions to 
strengthen their own industrial bases again.5
large production cuts during the crisis …
In the fall of 2008 the crisis at the financial markets very 
quickly caused a decrease in demand around the world, 
which led to recessions in nearly every region. Given the 
uncertainty in the global markets, capital goods produ-
cers suffered the greatest losses. According to our esti-
5  See for example Ezell, S.J. and Atkionson, R.D.: The Case for a National 
Manufacturing Strategy, The Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, 
April 2011.
edge technologie of aircraft and spacecraft. The advan-
tages it had in communication equipment in the midd-
le of the 1990s are now lost, and those in medical and 
precision instruments have diminished significantly. 
Germany is meanwhile strongly specialized in medi-
cal and precision instruments.
Between 1995 and 2007, German companies gained 
market shares in nearly every segment of the R&D-in-
tensive industries. In addition, they are very efficient at 
producing R&D-intensive goods.4 Indeed the traditio-
nally strong specialization on R&D-intensive industries 
may bear risks, as proven by the strong decline in pro-
4  Belitz, H., Gornig, M., Schiersch, A.: Deutsche Industrie durch forschungsin-
tensive Güter erfolgreich. DIW Berlin Wochenbericht, 9/2010, 2–10.
Figure 1
Relative shares of nominal value added by industrial groups in select countries and regions  
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Comments: The relative share of value added or RVA represents the contribution of an industry to the nominal value added in its country in relation to the same contri-
butions in the group of benchmark countries comprising the US, Japan and the EU-25.
Example for reading the table: The R&D-intensive industries in Germany show the highest relative share of value added among the countries considered here. The EU-10 
curve in the negative area refers to the less than average but growing contribution from R&D industries. See the Box for definitions of the industrial groups.
US 2008 estimated, Japan: 2007 and 2008 estimated.
Sources: EU KLEMS Datenbasis 11/2009; OECD STAN 2010; calculations and estimates of DIW Berlin.
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mates, the share of industry to total value added fell in 
every country. In 2010 it was still lower than in 2007, 
the year before the crisis (Figure 2).
Japan reported the greatest drops: 2.9 percentage points 
in R&D-intensive and 2.6 percentage points in non-
R&D-intensive industries. In Germany, the share of 
R&D-intensive industries fell by 2.3 percentage points 
to 11.5 percent between 2007 and 2009. These strongly 
export-oriented industries were hit especially hard by the 
slump in global demand for capital goods. In contrast, 
the decline in non-R&D-intensive industries turned out 
to be relatively minor, at 0.3 percentage points.
In 2010 Japan showed the greatest annual growth in 
the contribution of R&D-intensive industries to value 
added (2.6 percentage points). Germany came second 
at 1.1 percentage points.
R&D-intensive industries and knowledge-intensi-
ve services
Research-intensive manufacturing industries are the produ-
cers of goods using high-level and cutting-edge technolo-
gies, defined as follows:1
The cutting-edge technology category includes goods  •	
for which internal R&D expenditures comprise, on an 
OECD average, more than 7 percent of revenues. This 
is the case for pharmaceuticals, office machinery and 
computers, communication equipment, medical and 
precision instruments, and aircraft and spacecraft.
The high-level technology category includes goods for  •	
which internal R&D expenditures comprise between 
2.5 and 7 percent of revenues. This includes chemicals, 
machinery,  electrical machinery and apparatus, motor 
vehicles, and other transport equipment.
This distinction is based on the R&D intensity and not meant 
to imply that cutting-edge technology is more “advanced” 
or “valuable”. Goods using cutting-edge technology are 
more frequently subject to government intervention in the 
form of subsidies, government contracts, and non-tariff 
trade barriers. Policies are created to promote them not 
only with technological goals in mind, but also in pursuit 
of national goals in areas such as defense, healthcare and 
the aerospace industry.
1  Legler, H., Frietsch, R.: Neuabgrenzung der Wissenswirtschaft—for-
schungsintensive Industrien und wissensintensive Dienstleistungen (NIW/ 
ISI-Listen 2006), Studien zum deutschen Innovationssystem No. 22-2007, 
German Federal Ministry of Education and Research, Berlin 2007.
Division of European countries into survey 
regions
The “EU-14” are the original EU member states with the 
exception of Germany: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
the United Kingdom, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the 
Netherlands, Austria, Spain, Portugal and Sweden.
The “EU-10” are the countries that become members in May 
2004: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, 
Slovakia, Czech Republic, Hungary and Cyprus. Bulgaria and 
Romania, which joined the EU in 2007, were not considered 
in the survey.
Data basis
Data compiled by the European research consortium (EU 
KLEMS) and the OECD (STAN) provide the data basis for an 
international comparison for the period from 1995 to 2007. 
The EU KLEMS version of March 2008 provides detailed 
data, grouped by sector, for every year up to 2005. The 
values for 2006 and 2007 for Germany, the US and the EU 
countries have been added, and in some cases estimated, 
from the more current EU KLEMS version of November 2009 
and the OECD STAN data from 2010. The later EU KLEMS 
provided data for a more limited classification by sector.
Data was further drawn from national reported production 
indices, price indices, incoming orders, capacity utilization, 
etc. to calculate the value added and the volumes of work 
to the present. This data was processed using ARIMAx and 
naive models to project the value added and volumes of 
work for each sector up to the present.2
2  For more details, refer to Schiersch, A., Belitz, H., Gornig, M.: 
Fortschreibung internationaler Wirtschaftsstrukturdaten für FuE-intensive 
Industrien. Studien zum deutschen Innovationssystem No. 5/2011.  
Commission of Experts for Research and Innovation, Berlin, February 2011. 
www.e-fi.de.
Box 1
classification by sector and region, data basis9 DIW Economic Bulletin 2.2011
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… but only minor reduction in employment
Analyzing production trends is not enough to evaluate 
the repercussions of the financial and economic crisis 
on the German economy. Rather, it is also necessary to 
determine changes in employment and labour produc-
tivity. The DIW therefore estimated these time series for 
different countries and presents the results in this report 
to an international audience for the first time.
During 2009, the volume of labour in the R&D-intensi-
ve industries declined in all of the countries considered 
in this report (Figure 3). The UK and the US suffered 
the greatest declines compared to 2007, the year befo-
re the crisis. There were strong decreases in the volu-
me of labour in Germany as well. However, these were 
more moderate than the production cuts would have im-
plied. This development, however, was also different due 
to the fact that labour market stakeholders (companies, 
unions and governmente) took great efforts to prevent 
a reduction in jobs because of the crisis.
Short-time work was one tool in this respect.6 In Au-
gust 2008, shortly before the financial crisis became 
an economic crisis, about 4,000 companies and 40,000 
employees were supported by this instrument. This fi-
gure then skyrocketed. It finally peaked in May 2009, 
when 56,000 companies applied short-time work rules 
to more than 1.4 million employees.7 At the same time, 
the number of employees only shrank by 310,000, in the 
already seasonal weak period, from August 2008 to Ja-
nuary 2009. In April 2009 the unemployment rate for 
the workforce force was at its zenith during the crisis at 
8.6 percent, though this was still below the yearly ave-
rage from 2005 to 2007. At the same time, the number 
of hours worked per employee fell by more than 15 per-
cent between Q3 2008 and Q2 2009. This means that 
the enormous cut in production was not accompanied 
by an equally extreme reduction in jobs.8 Rather, many 
companies held on tight to their employees despite the 
lack of orders and the strong underutilization of their 
production capacities, to ensure that they would have 
the necessary firm specific human capital and capa-
cities to quickly return to pre-crisis production levels. 
6  For a detailed presentation of the changes to short-time working rules as a 
result of the crisis, especially in terms of economic short-time allowances, refer 
to Mai, C. M.: Der Arbeitsmarkt im Zeichen der Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise. 
Wirtschaft und Statistik, 3, 2010, 237–247.
7  The data on short-time working and the following information on 
employement figures and hours worked was drawn from the Genesis database 
run by the Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt), www-genesis.
destatis.de
8  Another step used heavily to maintain employment during the financial 
and economic crises was the work-off of overtime account balances. Zapf, I., 
Brehmer, W.: Working time accounts have proven to be of value. IAB Brief 
Report, 22/2010.
Other actions also assisted these efforts, such as addi-
tional state subsidies to companies for research, deve-
lopment and innovation.9
only short-term decline in labour 
productivity
These policies of German firms during the crisis, caused 
a decrease in labour productivity in 2009 which had ne-
ver been seen before. Every R&D-intensive industry in 
Germany was affected (Figure 3). Labour productivity in 
machinery declined particularly drastically, but this in-
dustry also reported the harshest production cuts. How-
ever, in 2010 labour productivity in the R&D-intensive 
industries in Germany was nearly back to the pre-crisis 
level. The strategy pursued during the crisis to secure 
jobs thus had no long-term negative impact on labour 
productivity as a measure of production efficiency.10
Labour productivity in the UK and the US, which tradi-
tionally follow more conservative labour market policies, 
9  According to the Center for European Economic Research (ZEW), 
innovation expenditure did not shrink as much as production during the 2009 
year of crisis, meaning that the intensity of innovation even increased from 
2.72 to 2.74 percent. The R&D-intensive industries were especially persistent, 
increasing their intensity of innovation from 7.7 to 8.4 percent. Rammer C. et 
al. (2011): Innovationserhebung für Deutschland 2010—Mit Schwung aus der 
Krise. Mannheim, January 2011.
10  Based on the available data, no comment can be made on the 
adjustments to and efficiency of the capital input.
Figure 2
contribution of R&D-intensive and non-R&D-intensive industries 
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Sources: EU KLEMS Datenbasis 11/2009; calculations and estimates of DIW Berlin.
© DIW Berlin 2011
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tors also rose during 2009. Therefore, measured by la-
bour productivity, the efficiency of the US R&D-intensi-
ve industries even improved as a result of the crisis.
The development of labour volume and labour produc-
tivity in the two Anglo-Saxon countries is characterised 
by the policy of “hire and fire”. Nonetheless, the grea-
ter productivity in these two countries did not transla-
te into relatively higher market shares for the R&D-in-
tensive industries. Rather, Germany held onto its lead 
over the UK and the US.
conclusions
The R&D-intensive and heavily export-oriented German 
manufacturing industry has passed its trial by fire du-
ring the global economic crisis and at least held onto its 
leading international competitive position. This success 
is due principally to the fact that companies were mostly 
able to maintain their human capital throughout the cri-
sis because of the concerted action of company manage-
ment, unions and politicians. In this regard, however, 
there is always a risk of preserving industry structures 
that will no longer be competitive in the long term.
To be able to react appropriately and flexibly to future 
shocks to global demand, the actors need instruments 
that allow them to distinguish between temporary de-
creases in demand and long-term structural changes. 
This could prevent existing competitive advantages from 
being recklessly jeopardized and, at the same time help 
reduce the subsidies needed to preserve obsolete structu-
res. This is why we see the need for a scientifically foun-
ded, international industrial monitoring system which 
gives politicians early indication of upcoming structu-
ral shocks triggered by external factors.
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showed quite different trends.11 The decline in the volu-
me of labour in the R&D-intensive sectors of both coun-
tries was so harsh that in some cases it overcompensa-
ted the decrease in value added. In the UK, labour pro-
ductivity in the R&D-intensive industries diminished 
in 2009, but this was mainly due to the temporary pro-
ductivity losses in machinery and electrical machine-
ry. In contrast, labour productivity increased further in 
the other R&D-intensive industries.
This trend was even more pronounced in the US manu-
facturing industry. The companies in the US reacted to 
the crisis by reducing their workforce, often more than 
their production decreased. Except for machinery, this 
meant that labour productivity in the R&D-intensive sec-
11  For the US also Schatz, P., Spitznagel, E.: Macroeconomic dynamism of 
labour markets: a comparison of internal and external flexibilities in the USA 
and in Germany. WSI-Mitteilungen, 63 (12), 2010, 626–635.
Figure 3
labour volume and labour productivity in the 
R&D-intensive industries 




























Sources: EU KLEMS Datenbasis 11/2009; calculations and estimates of  
DIW Berlin.
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The labour productivity of the R&D-intensive industries is greater 
now that before the crisis.DIW Economic Bulletin 2.2011
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